ABSTRACT With the rapid development of wireless communications and mobile devices with location capability, location-based services (LBS) have been extensively used in almost all social and business domains. In terms of privacy and efficiency, there are two main limitations in the existing work that have to be addressed. First, they fail to preserve the location and content privacy simultaneously. Second, they do not support the range queries. In this paper, we propose a secure and efficient privacy-preserving range query protocol in the LBS, which satisfies the three requirements of the location privacy and content privacy protection, query efficiency, and scalable index size. To achieve location privacy and content privacy, we adopt the prefix membership verification scheme to encode index elements and a bloom filter to store index elements. To achieve query efficiency and scalable index size, a balanced dynamic binary tree structure called DBtree is proposed. Furthermore, to improve the query efficiency, we propose both the index element encoding optimization and traversal optimization algorithms. Finally, we evaluate our scheme both on the simulated and real-world datasets. The experimental results demonstrate the security and efficiency of our scheme.
I. INTRODUCTION
With the rapid development of wireless communications and mobile devices with location capability (e.g., smart phones, tablets, and watches), location-based services (LBS) have been extensively used in almost all social and business domains. A common service of LBS is to search nearby points of interest (poi). Through the accurate location provided by mobile devices, one can query some of these poi records at a distance. For example, a user may issue a LBS query ''where is the most popular restaurant within 500 meters to my current location? '' Although the LBS provides a convenient lifestyle for people, there are several problems need to be addressed for the concern of privacy and efficiency, especially those regarding users' location [13] and query content privacy. By collecting and analyzing a user's current location and query content, the LBS provider can easily infer a lot of sensitive information of the user [1] , such as health status and hobby.
On the other hand, the query user tends to care for a few poi records, which are the most popular according to his query. Meanwhile, returning a large amount of poi records will cause considerable computation and communication costs. For example, a query user may prefer the one with high popularity when he/she intends to find a restaurant nearby. Therefore, how to design a secure and efficient privacypreserving range query protocol that protects both the query content and the location privacy is of paramount importance.
To address these problems, many existing efforts have recently been dedicated to design privacy-preserving techniques for LBS [2] - [13] , [27] , [31] - [33] . Anonymity-based schemes separate users' identities from their location information, such as k-anonymity [2] , Dummy-Q [3] , and l-diversity [4] . These schemes usually require a trusted third party (TTP), in order to blur the exact location of the user into a cloaked region [5] . However, the TTP would easily become the single target of attacks and establishing a trusted TTP is very difficult. To avoid using TTP, dummy-based schemes confuse the real query of the user by adding noise (such as differential privacy [8] - [10] , [31] - [33] ) or generalizing location data [6] , [7] . However, most of these schemes bring much communication or computation costs on the user side, which leads to much energy consumption on mobile devices. Encryption-based schemes [11] - [13] can fully guarantee the accuracy and security of the data and provide more stringent privacy protection. However, additional hardware and complex algorithm support are needed.
In [13] - [16] , attempts were made to simultaneously preserve the privacy of query content and location information. However, they only focus on privacy preserving and downgrade the quality of users' location information. Comparing the above schemes on privacy protection, there are at least a few shortcomings: (1) reliance on a third party; (2) failure to simultaneously preserve the location and query content privacy; and (3) requiring significant communication or computation cost.
Furthermore, the LBS provider often has many poi records that satisfy the query request. However, the query user tends to care for a few of the most popular poi about his query. Zhang et al. [17] , [18] proposed a secure spatial top-k query processing scheme in untrusted LBS. However, they mainly target the integrity verification of query results without protecting data privacy. Li et al. [19] , [20] proposed an adaptive secure range query processing scheme and an IBtree space compression algorithm over encrypted data in cloud computing. However, the storage space of the index structure is large and extra computation overhead were required. Therefore, how to design a secure and efficient privacy-preserving range query protocol in LBS is still a challenging issue.
To address the above problems, we propose a secure and efficient privacy-preserving range query protocol in the LBS, which satisfies the three requirements of the location and query content privacy protection, query efficiency, and scalable index size. To achieve location and query content privacy, we adopt the prefix membership verification scheme [21] to encode index elements and a bloom filter to store index elements in DBtree construction and the trapdoor generation stage. To achieve query efficiency and scalable index size, we propose a balanced dynamic binary tree structure called DBtree (where ''D'' stands for dynamic and ''B'' stands for bloom filter), where each node is represented as a bloom filter, of which the size is determined by the number of index elements. To optimize query efficiency, we propose both the index element encoding optimization and traversal optimization scheme, to reduce the number of nodes to be traversed in DBtree during the query process. Finally, we conduct extensive experiments and security analysis, which confirm the efficiency and security of our proposed scheme.
The main contributions of this paper are: 1) A secure and efficient privacy-preserving range query protocol in the LBS, which can preserve both the privacy of query content and location information simultaneously.
2) To achieve query efficiency, we propose a DBtree index tree structure, an index element encoding optimization scheme and a traversal optimization scheme. 3) Performing security analysis and conduct extensive experiments to evaluate the performance of our scheme on a real-world and simulated dataset, respectively. Experimental results show that our scheme is secure and efficient. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. First, we formulates the problem in section II. Then, we introduce the proposed scheme in section III and the search optimization scheme in section IV. Sections V and VI presents the security analysis and the performance evaluation, respectively. Finally, section VII reviews the related works and concludes the paper in section VIII. 
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION A. SYSTEM MODEL
As shown in Fig. 1 , three entities (the data owner, the LBS provider, and the query users) comprise our system model. The data owner collects a series of location and related information from the businesses called poi records, these poi records are outsourced to the LBS provider. Then, the query users, who have interest to find the needed poi information, can submit their queries to the LBS provider. The LBS provider searches the poi records, then returns the results which satisfy the queries to the query users. We assumed LBS provider to be cloud servers who have enough computation and storage resource. In order to protect the data privacy and improve the searching efficiency of LBS, we need a scheme to do it as describing in follows in detail.
1) DATA OWNER
The data owner collects the poi records to form a dataset denoted as POI = {poi 1 , poi 2 , ..., poi n }. For simplicity, we use (lon i , lat i ), W i , s i to represent the poi i record, where (lon i , lat i ) denotes the spatial coordinates, W i is a set of keywords that describe the poi in all aspects (containing a major category, secondary category, name, etc.), and s i is the score in the range of 1 to 10 (i.e., the popularity of poi, to support range queries). To prevent LBS provider from obtaining information about location and content of poi, the data owner encrypts each poi record to form an encrypted dataset denoted by POI = {poi 1 , poi 2 , ..., poi n }. Moreover, to enable an efficient search on the encrypted dataset POI , the data owner has to build a secure index I for dataset POI . The data owner then outsource both the index I and POI to the LBS provider. The data owner also grants the part of users the right to submit their queries to search the encrypted poi records stored in LBS. To finish the authorization, the data owner distributes the decryption key and k pseudo-random functions to the query users for data decryption and the generation of trapdoor, respectively.
2) THE QUERY USERS
The query users are the authorized users, who can query the outsourced poi data items in LBS. When a query user wants to request a LBS provider to find encrypted poi records with keyword set W u and score greater than s u at query radius d from his/her current location (lon u , lat u ), we represent such a query request as q = (lon u , lat u ), d, W u , s u . In order not to expose location and query context privacy, the query user computes the trapdoors T (see the trapdoor generation algorithm in section III.D) for q using the k pseudo-random functions obtained from the data owner, and then submits T to the LBS provider. After the query user gets the results returned from LBS, they can decrypt the poi records using the key obtained from the data owner.
3) THE LBS PROVIDER
The LBS provider mainly performs two functions: a) storing the encrypted poi records from the data owner and b) processing the users' range query over encrypted poi records. When receiving a query from a query user, based on the trapdoors T and index I , the LBS provider can search and find which encrypted poi records satisfy the query request. The query results are then returned to the query user.
During this process, the secure index I should not leak any information about the poi records. The LBS provider cannot infer any true information of the encrypted poi records and trapdoors T , such as the location and content of the poi records, as well as the query q.
B. THREAT MODEL
In this paper, we assume that the LBS provider is semihonest. It is regarded as ''honest but curious'', which is the same as prior works [28] , [29] . The LBS provider is semihonest, meaning that it will follow the proposed protocol (e.g., correctly execute the required algorithms). However, it may attempt to deduce the actual information of the encrypted poi records and trapdoor T . In addition, we consider in our work the query users and data owner to be completely trusted entities.
C. DESIGN GOALS
Based on the aforementioned system model, our design goal is to achieve a secure and efficient privacy-preserving range query scheme for LBS. Specifically, our scheme aims to achieve the following three goals: 1) Security: The proposed scheme should simultaneously preserve the privacy of the poi records and the context of user queries. If only one privacy is protected, the LBS provider is able to infer privacy information about the other one, such as the context and location of the poi records, query context and location of the query user. 2) Efficiency: The proposed scheme should efficiently process the query of the users without disclosing the true content of the poi records and query q. In addition, the query users should quickly compute the trapdoors T according to the query q. 3) Range query: The proposed range query scheme should guarantee that only the most relevant poi records should be contained in the query result corresponding to the query q. The unnecessary cost of communication should be prevented.
III. PROPOSED SCHEME
We detail our DBtree scheme with the following steps: index element encoding, BF construction, DBtree construction, trapdoor generation, and query processing. First, given a dataset of POI , we present our DBtree construction algorithm, which is executed by the data owner. Second, given a query quest, we propose our trapdoor generation algorithm, which is executed by the query user. Finally, based on the DBtree and trapdoor, the LBS provider is able to process the query on the DBtree and return the query results to the query users.
A. INDEX ELEMENT ENCODING
For a data item poi i , there are two types of index elements: numeric (i.e., longitude lon i , latitude lat i , and score s i ) and non-numeric (i.e., a set of keywords W i ). For a nonnumeric index element, by connecting it with the corresponding attribute name, it can be encoded into a new keyword. For example, we encode a category ''cafe'' into keyword ''CAT:cafe'', where ''CAT'' is the attribute name of ''cafe''. For a numeric element, our purpose is to determine whether a number falls into a range. To achieve this, we apply the scheme named prefix membership verification [21] , which converts determining whether a number belongs to a range to determining whether the intersection of the two sets is empty. Given a number x with the binary form of w bits, it can be expressed as and PF(13) ∩ RF( [11, 15] ) = {11**}. After the minimum prefix family is calculated, by connecting the corresponding attribute name, we can get the encoding keywords. For example, if the keyword ''SCO'' is the attribute of query range [11, 15] , we have RF( [11, 15] )={''SCO : 1011'', ''SCO : 11**''}. In this step, for a data item poi i ∈ POI , the data owner encodes all of its index elements (i.e., longitude lon i , latitude lat i , keyword set W i , and score s i ) into a new set of keywords (denoted by W i ), by concatenating its corresponding attribute names ''LON '', ''LAT '', ''CAT '', and ''SCO'', respectively.
B. BF CONSTRUCTION
Bloom filters (BF) is a probabilistic data structure that can store a set of elements in a space-efficient manner. This data structure is commonly used for fast set membership verification. A bloom filter uses a bit-array of m-bits, which are all initially set to 0 with k pseudo-random hash functions
. Each of these k locations are set to 1.
Given a data item poi i , we assume a set of z keywords is obtained through the index element encoding stage, denoted
To protect the privacy of the keyword set W i , we use a bloom filter denoted by BF to store the W i of the poi i . We assume that the query user and data owner share k pseudo-random hash functions, denoted In this step, based on the one-wayness property of pseudorandom hash functions or bloom filter in [19] , we achieve privacy protection of the data. That is, given k pseudo-random hash functions and a keyword set W , it is easy to compute the BF. However given a BF, computing W is computationally infeasible.
C. DBTREE CONSTRUCTION
Given a dataset POI = {poi 1 , poi 2 , · · · , poi n } (where each data item poi i corresponds to a keyword set W i ), to achieve the efficiency of the search, we organize the dataset POI into our DBtree data structure, which is different from prior works [19] , [20] . Reference [19] uses a fixed-size BF for each node in the PBtree, which is determined by the total number of keywords contained in the root node (of whole dataset). The construction of the BF of each non-terminal node is based on the BF of its children nodes by OR operation that can reduce the construction time. However, the fixed size causes large storage overhead. Especially when processing large-scale datasets, the obvious limit of the fixed size is the need for massive unnecessary storage space. Because the number of keywords for a terminal node is far less than the root node, all of the non-root nodes will consume too much unnecessary memory. Although [20] proposes an IBtree space compression algorithm, it also requires considerable storage and extra computation overhead. Different from the scheme in [20] , we dynamically set the size of the BF by the value of the m/n = t, where m is the size of the BF, n is the number of keywords that must be mapped, and t is a constant. The dynamic size of the BF in our DBtree can effectively reduce much of the previously needed storage space. DBtree definition: A DBtree for n data items is a balanced binary tree with n−1 non-terminal nodes and n terminal nodes, where each node is represented as a bloom filter. Each terminal node corresponds to a poi record, and the BF is constructed from its keyword set W . Each non-terminal node contains multiple poi records, and the BF is constructed by the union of the keyword set of all poi records, where the size of the BF is dynamically set by the number of unique keywords in this node that need to be mapped. We define the node in the DBtree as:
where Id denotes the id of the poi record in a terminal node, and BF and m denote the bloom filter and size of the u node , respectively. p l and p r denote the pointers to left and right child, respectively. Fig. 2 shows a DBtree for the dataset POI = {poi 1 , poi 2 , poi 3 , poi 4 , poi 5 , poi 6 , poi 7 }. For example, the node poi 2−3 contains the data items poi 2 and poi 3 , and the BF is constructed by the union of the keyword set W 2 and W 3 . Given a set of POI = {poi 1 , poi 2 , · · · , poi n }, the data owner builds a DBtree in a top-down manner based on the DBtreeConstruction-algorithm described in algorithm 1. We first calculate the BF of the root node by the union of all keyword sets of the complete set POI , and we set m to the m/n = t. Then, we divide POI into two subsets: POI l and POI r . If n is an even number, then |POI l | = |POI r |; otherwise, |POI l | = |POI r | + 1. Finally, we compute the BF and m of the two child nodes of the root by the two subsets POI l and POI r , respectively. We recursively apply the above three steps until every terminal node contains only one data item. Then, the data owner encrypts each data item poi i ∈ POI , denoted as Enc(poi i , k d ), where Enc(·) is a secret encryption method (like AES, SHA1) and k d is a secret key shared between the query user and the data owner. Both the encrypted dataset and DBtree are then sent to the LBS provider. Note that the same k pseudo-random hash functions are used for constructing all BF in a DBtree and the value of m/n is not fixed. For example, to save storage space, we set m/n to 5 for all non-terminal nodes; to reduce false positives, we set m/n to 10 for all terminal nodes.
Algorithm 1 DBtreeConstruction
Input: 
To protect location and query content privacy of the query users, the query user first computes the trapdoor T for the query q. First, based on the location (lon u , lat u ) and radius d, the query user computes the minimum bounding rectangle (that is, the range of longitude and latitude, denoted as [lon min , lon max ] and [lat min , lat max ]), using the distance formula between two points. For example, the distance between two points (lon 1 , lat 1 ) and (lon 2 , lat 2 ) can be computed as follows:
where a = lon 1 We then obtain four sets of keywords. Third, given a keyword set W = {w 1 , w 2 , · · · , w z }, for each keyword w j (1 ≤ j ≤ z), the query user randomly selects g hash functions from k hash functions, and computes g hash locations:
The sub-trapdoor for the keyword set W , denoted as M , is a matrix of z * g hashes: 
E. QUERY PROCESSING
When the LBS provider receives a trapdoor T from a query user, it calls the SearchPoi-algorithm described in algorithm 3 and returns the range query results. We assume that u represents the currently visited node, and M is a sub-trapdoor with a matrix of z * g. When the LBS provider traverses to a node, there are two result cases: continue traversal or terminate it.
1) CONTINUE TRAVERSAL

If there exists a row
If u is a non-terminal node, continue recursively processing the left and right child of the node u. Otherwise, insert the poi record associated with node u to the set of query results R. We now analyze the worst-case time complexity of the query processing algorithm. We use n and |R| to respectively denote the number of poi record included in the DBtree and the number of the query result R, and use M to represent a subtrapdoor with a matrix of z * g. The time of search for each poi record in R is O(log n). In the worst case, there are at most |R| non-terminal nodes whose BF satisfy the sub-trapdoor M in a same layer of the DBtree, and the match time for each node whose BF satisfies the sub-trapdoor M is O(z * g). Therefore, the time complexity is O(z * g * |R| log n) for the query processing algorithm. In reality, z and g are constant, and |R| n as n is considerably large. Thus, the query processing time is sub-linear.
IV. SEARCH OPTIMIZATION
To improve the efficiency of query in the DBtree, we propose both the coding and traversing optimization to reduce the number of nodes that must be traversed in the query processing stage.
A. TRAVERSING OPTIMIZATION
Recall our DBtree construction algorithm. For a non-terminal node with dataset POI , we divide POI into two subsets POI l and POI r , so that 0 ≤ |POI l | − |POI r | ≤ 1, where POI l corresponds to the first half and POI r corresponds to the latter. However, this division is crucial for the query processing performance of the DBtree, because a sub-query result R = R l ∪ R r will lead to traversing both sub-trees, where R l ⊆ POI l and R r ⊆ POI r . Therefore, we hope that the query result is most likely to be included in one sub-tree.
To achieve this goal, we propose our division method. We assume only one primary category for a data item poi, given a dataset POI = {poi 1 , poi 2 , · · · , poi n } with the primary category set C POI = {c 1 , c 2 , · · · , c e }. First, we obtain two sets of {POI 1 , POI 2 , · · · , POI e } and Num = {n 1 , n 2 , · · · , n e } by classifying the dataset POI according to poi categories, where POI j represents the dataset that contains the category c j , and n j represents the number of poi records in the set POI j . For each category c j ∈ C POI , we sort the dataset POI j in ascending order according to longitude, latitude, and score of the data items. As for numerical attributes, adjacent values should be included in one sub-tree. Second, based on both sets of C POI and Num, we can easily divide POI into two subsets, POI l and POI r , so that the value of |POI r | − |POI l | is the smallest and it makes |C POI l ∩ C POI r | = ∅ (that is, there are no data items belonging to the same category in C POI l and C POI r ) via the Algorithm 4. This algorithm is based on dynamic programming and is designed to evenly divide a collection into two sets. Third, we recursively process the nodes using the second step. When there is only one category for a node, we divide the dataset into two sub-sets, in which the left child corresponds to the first half and the right child corresponds to the latter half. Finally, we recursively process a node by the third step, until only one data item is included in each leaf node. For example, suppose C = {c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , c 4 , c 5 } and Num = {2, 2, 3, 4, 4}, Fig. 3 shows a part of DBtree for 15 data items by the second step, where the number in the node represents the number of data items contained. We now analyze the time complexity of the traversing optimization algorithm. Let n be the number of poi record included in the DBtree, and e be the number of primary category. We first require O(n log n) time to sort the dataset according to category, longitude, latitude, and score of the data items. We then require O(e 2 ) time to divide the dataset according to category. In fact, e n as e is often less than 1000 and n is typically large. Therefore, the time complexity is O(n log n) for the traversing optimization algorithm.
B. CODING OPTIMIZATION
Assume that a node u contains the keyword set {''Type:Cafe'', ''Type:Hotel'', ''Score:9.0'', ''Score:9.5''}, and the left and right child contain the keyword sets {''Type:Cafe'', ''Score:9.0''} and {''Type:Hotel'', ''Score:9.5''}, respectively. Given a query {''Type:Hotel'', ''Score:9.0''}, the node u satisfies the query condition by keyword matching. We then
Algorithm 4 DivideSet
Input: The set Num = {n 1 , n 2 , · · · , n e }, n is the size of the set, sum is the sum of set Output: The two sets NumLeft and NumRight Initialize an empty array currentSum to represent the maximum sum of the currently selectable elements; Initialize an empty array state to represent the state of the selected elements;
recursively process the left and right child of the node u. From this example, we can see that an unnecessary check is conducted for the two children nodes of the u. This problem is very serious, especially when processing large-scale data. If the keyword set of the u is {''Cafe:9.0'', ''Hotel:9.5''}, and the two child nodes are {''Cafe:9.0''} and {''Hotel:9.5''}, when a query is {''Hotel:9.0''}, we only need to check the node u. In our system model, we assume only one major category for a poi record (such as Cafe and Hotel), and the query user often only queries the major categories. For a data item poi i , we assume a set of z keywords are obtained by the index element encoding stage, denoted as W i = {w 1 , w 2 , · · · , w z }, where the keyword w j represents the category. We first delete w j from W i , then connect the other keywords in W i with w j to form a new keyword set.
V. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the security of our DBtree based privacy-preserving range query scheme under our threat model.
poi Records: We use a symmetric encryption algorithm (such as AES, SHA1 ) to encrypt the poi record before uploading. As long as the encryption algorithm is secure, the LBS provider will not know the true contents of poi records.
DBtree: A DBtree is viewed as a set of BF, where each BF stores a set of keywords. We use k pseudo-random hash functions to construct the BF for a keyword set {w 1 .w 2 , · · · , w z }. A function is a pseudo-random hash function if and only if the output cannot be distinguished from the output of a truly random function for a probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) adversary [22] . Let h : {0, 1} n × {0, 1} m → {0, 1} e be a function, which takes n-bit strings and m-bit keys as inputs and maps them to e-bit strings. Let H : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} e be a random function, which takes n-bit strings to ebit strings. If h(·) is a pseudo-random function, it satisfies the following two conditions: given input w ∈ {0, 1} n and k ∈ {0, 1} m , h(w, k) can be computed efficiently; and given the h(w, k), it is not feasible to calculate the value of w and k for any PPT adversary A with non-negligible probability. Our scheme implements IND-CKA security by using pseudorandom functions. The IND-CKA security model ensures that the adversary cannot infer the information of a dataset from its index. We consider a game played between a challenger C and a PPT adversary A. We assume adversary A has a nonnegligible advantage ξ as the attacker in this game. Next, we reference [19] to prove that our DBtree scheme is IND-CKA secure.
DBtree Construction: C generates a data set P and sends it to A. By selecting polynomial number of subsets from P, A constructs a collectionP of subsets and then sends P to C. After choosing k functions h (h is either pseudorandom or truly random), C performs the DBtree construction algorithm to build a DBtree index I i for each subset P i ∈P. Finally, C submits all subsets with their associated DBtree to A.
Range Queries: A initiates a range query q to C. C computers a trapdoor T for q by using trapdoor generation algorithm and returns it to A. Based on a trapdoor T and an index I , A can obtain the corresponding query result by using DBtree query-processing algorithm.
Challenge: After doing some queries, A generates a subset P 0 from P and selects another nonempty subset P 1 fromP, such that
A sends P 0 and P 1 to C. C randomly chooses a subset P j (j = 0, 1) and builds a DBtree I j for P j and gives I j to A.
Guess: A outputs the guess j ∈ {0, 1} for j. If j = j, when A outputs 0, showing that it doesn't know h is pseudo-random function or A outputs 1. We defined the advantage of A in winning this game is Adv A = |P[j = j ]−1/2|. Next, we show that A can win the game with advantage greater than ξ .
Evidently, when h is a pseudo-random function,
We prove the latter from two aspects of the generated DBtree and trapdoor.
First, the DBtrees of other subsets inP will not reveal the information of P 0 and P 1 . Recall that our DBtree construction process, each node u is set to a different size m and the hash string s is mapped to the u.BF by using h and u.m. We view u.BF as an output string of h. If h is pseudo-random function, then for any PPT adversary
1} e ]| < ξ , which indicates that it is computationally indistinguishable for the strings outputs by the pseudo-random functions and the truly random functions. Therefore, for two different Bloom filters BF i and BF j , each of which maps a string by h, it is impossible for any A to distinguish whether the two strings being mapped are the same or different. In other words, A cannot get information about (P 0 − P 1 ) ∪ (P 1 − P 0 ) from the corresponding DBtrees of other subsets inP. Second, to generate trapdoor T , we transform the query q into four location matrices by our trapdoor generation algorithm. The adversary A cannot infer any sensitive information from the location matrices. Due to the restrictions on query selection, there is no data item d i ∈ (P 0 − P 1 ) ∪ (P 1 − P 0 ) in any query results. Meanwhile, by applying the randomly selected g hash functions from k hash functions to compute location matrix, the security level increases. Therefore, no generated trapdoors reveal the difference between P 0 and P 1 . Third, when |P 0 | = |P 1 |, no information is revealed from the index I j . Obviously, A guesses j correctly with probability 1/2. Thus,
, that is, A can win the game with advantage greater than ξ . Thus, our DBtree scheme is IND-CKA secure.
VI. EXPERIMENTS AND PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this section, we evaluate the performance of the DBtree in terms of the construction time of the index and trapdoor, query processing time, and index sizes.
A. SIMULATION SETTINGS 1) DATASETS
In all experiments, we evaluate the performance of DBtree on two datasets. First, we randomly generate 1 million of the simulated data. For convenience, we randomly generate a four-tuple: <lon, lat, s, c> to represent a poi records, where lon is longitude, ranging from 116 o to 117 o ; lat is latitude, ranging from 40 • to 50 o ; s is score, ranging from 5.00 to 10; and c is category, assuming there is only one major category. Second, we also use the real datasets, which contain 0.57 million poi records across North America (NA) from the US Census Bureau [35] . The difference between the two datasets is that the geographic coordinates, categories, and scores of the simulated data are evenly distributed. Therefore, the use of simulated datasets can better evaluate the performance of our scheme. We perform the same processing for the two datasets in the index element coding phase. We assume that the latitude and the longitude are five decimal numbers, the corresponding geographical location is accurate to 1 meters. We first separate the integral and decimal parts. For the integral part, we concatenate its corresponding attribute name. For the decimal part, we transform it into a fivebit integer by multiplying by 100000. The prefix family is then calculated. For the score s, we assume that there are two decimal numbers, and transform it into an integer by multiplying by 100. Finally, the number of unique keywordrecords is 48 for each poi record. The details of encoding are as follows: lon and lat are denoted using 17 bits each; and s is denoted using 10 bits each. Similarly, we use the above method to process a range in the trapdoor generation phase. Note that when the integer parts of boundary values of a range are not the same, we divide the range into several sub-ranges for which the integer part of the boundary values remains the same. 
2) DBtree TYPE
To evaluate the performance of our DBtree, we conducted extensive experiments on the following two schemes: (1) DBtree_b, which is the basic DBtree scheme without any optimization; and (2) DBtree_ct, which is the DBtree plus index coding and traversal optimization.
3) IMPLEMENTATION DETAILS
The experiments are conducted using the C ++ programming language on a desktop PC running Windows 10 Professional with a 3.40-GHz Intel Core i3-3240 processor and 4-GB memory. To weigh index size and false positive, we set the bloom filter parameter m/n = 5 for non-leaf nodes and m/n = 10 for leaf nodes. Because of m/n = 10, there is no false positive, and the number of bloom filter hash functions is 7.
B. INDEX CONSTRUCTION TIME AND TRAPDOOR GENERATION TIME Fig. 4a shows that the time cost of index construction. The average time of index construction for DBtree_b and DBtree_ct, increase respectively from 104.2s to 1257.6s, and from 118.3s to 1360.4s, as the dataset sizes vary from VOLUME 6, 2018 Fig. 4b shows that the average time cost of trapdoor generation grows from 2.54ms to 21.36ms, when the query radius sizes grow from 1km to 10km. The experimental results demonstrate the index construction time and the trapdoor generation time is acceptable for the LBS provider and the query user, respectively. Finally, the DBtree construction incurs a one-time offline construction overhead.
C. QUERY PROCESSING TIME Table. 1 shows the relationship between the average time of query processing and the query result size. With the dataset sizes varying from 0.1 million to 1 million, the average time of query processing for DBtree_b and DBtree_ct, grow from 10.17ms to 102.3ms, and from 1.19ms to 4.92ms, respectively, the average query result size grows from 22 to 218. Fig. 5 shows the average time of query processing. When the dataset size is fixed to 1 million, with the query result size varying from 10 to 100 and the query radius range growing from 1km to 10km, from Fig. 5a , we observed that, the average time of query processing for DBtree_b and DBtree_ct, grow from 6.25ms to 48.56ms, and from 0.85ms to 2.36ms, respectively. On the other hand, from Fig. 5b , the average query processing time of DBtree_b and DBtree_ct, grow from 66.03ms to 101.3ms, and from 1.52ms to 4.45ms, respectively. Fig. 5c and 5d shows the average query processing time under the 0.57 million real dataset. With the query result size growing from 10 to 100, the average time of query processing for DBtree_b and DBtree_ct, grow from 7.16ms to 45.50ms, and from 0.98ms to 3.11ms, respectively. With the query radius range growing from 1km to 10km, the average query processing time of DBtree_b and DBtree_ct, grow from 31.35ms to 48.86ms, and from 0.81ms to 3.54ms, respectively. 6 shows the average time of query processing for two different query result sizes of 20 and 60. For |R| = 20, the average time of query processing for DBtree_b and DBtree_ct, respectively grow from 8.37ms to 10.9ms, and from 0.88ms to 1.07ms, with the dataset sizes varying from 0.1 million to 1 million. For |R| = 60, the average time of query processing for DBtree_b and DBtree_ct, correspondingly grow from 19.67ms to 27.38ms, and from 1.09ms to 2.03ms, respectively.
From Table. 1, Fig. 5 and Fig. 6 , we can conclude that our approach is very efficient. Compared with DBtree_b, our DBtree_ct can significantly improve searching efficiency. Fig. 7a shows that the DBtree sizes range from 51.5 MB to 600.82 MB when the dataset sizes varying from 0.1 million to 1 million. For a fixed size dataset, the index structures of DBtree_b and DBtree_ct are the same size.
D. INDEX SIZE
To enable comparison of our DBtree and the IBtree_CQ [20] methods in terms of index size, we use the same 3-dimensional dataset and m/n = 5 to calculate our DBtree size, where each dimensional of each data item is denoted by 32 bits. Thus, for a 3-dimensional dataset with 5 million records, the maximum number of unique keywordrecords is up to 495 million. As is shown in Fig. 7b , the index size of DBtree and IBtree_CQ, grow from 0.57 GB to 6.71 GB and 2.02 GB to 17.95 GB, respectively. Although the IBF is an array of m twins, our method is better than the IBtree in terms of index size. The experimental results demonstrate our DBtree can significantly reduce the index space.
VII. RELATED WORK A. PRIVACY PRESERVATION IN LOCATION-BASED SERVICE
Gruteser and Grunwald [2] first introduced the location k-anonymity model, of which the basic idea is to first require a TTP that gathers at least k queries from different users in a cloaking area, then separate users' identities from their location information. To avoid a single point of failure, Hashem and Kulik [30] proposed a scheme where the TTP is placed in an ad-hoc network consisting of a group of trusted users. In addition, many enhanced schemes based on k-anonymity have been proposed to protect privacy, such as l-diversity [4] , Dummy-Q [3] , and PLAM [15] . However, these schemes do not always provide sufficient privacy protection and establishing a trusted ad-hoc network in the real world is not always an easy job [23] .
To avoid the use of TTP while maintaining the location privacy, Kido et al. [24] first proposed the dummy-based privacy protection method [6] - [10] , in which the user mixed with his/her actual location by adding many random locations in his/her LBS query quest. These schemes must guarantee that LBS cannot distinguish the real location among the random ones. However, the communication overhead and computation cost will be increase. Therefore, encryptionbased schemes [11] - [13] , [23] , [25] can fully guarantee the accuracy and security of the data and provide more stringent privacy protection. Paulet et al. [23] presented a guaranteed privacy for both the poi data and user location scheme by using private information retrieval (PIR). It guarantees that LBS cannot infer the user location, and the user can obtain the poi records from the LBS without disclosing which record he/she is interested in. However, it takes a significantly longer time to initialize the query and response. This drawback makes it impractical to for implementation in mobile devices. Lien et al. [25] proposed PCQP and resolved the LBS queries in the 1-D space with a new secret circular shift scheme by using the Hilbert curve. However, the computation cost on the user side is related to not only the number of satisfied grid cells, but also the number of poi records. When the number of poi records becomes larger, this fact indicates that PCQP is not suitable for mobile devices. Shao et al. [13] introduced a fine-grained privacy-preserving LBS framework (named FINE), which provided rigorous location privacy and accurate query results. However, the cost in the cloud server is large and it is hard to implement in the server. The differential privacy techniques [31] - [33] also can protect location privacy without dependence on TTP servers. Unfortunately, when generating LBS queries and dealing with redundant poi records, these schemes bring significant communication and computation costs on the user side, which is unaffordable to the mobile devices. Zhu et al. [34] presented an efficient and privacy-preserving polygons spatial query framework for LBS, called Polaris, which achieves the location privacy of query user and confidentiality of LBS data. However, large computational overhead is also required based on an improved homomorphic encryption technology, meanwhile, an authoritative organization is needed to generate and send system parameters to LBS and cloud sever.
Comparing the above schemes on privacy protection, there is at least one of the following shortcomings: (1) reliance on a third party; (2) failure to simultaneously preserve the location and query content privacy; and (3) requiring much communication or computation cost. Unlike existing works, aimed at addressing these problems, we propose a secure and efficient privacy-preserving range query protocol in LBS, which can fully guarantee the location and query content privacy, efficient query processing and accurate query results.
B. SECURE TOP-K OR RANGE QUERY
Zhang et al. [17] , [18] proposed a secure spatial top-k query processing scheme in untrusted LBS, which guarantees the query efficiency for query users to search the most relevant poi records. However, they mainly aim at the integrity verification of query results without protecting the privacy of the query content and the LBS data. Li et al. [19] and [20] proposed an adaptive secure range query processing scheme over encrypted data in cloud computing. However, the storage space of index structure is huge. Although in [20] , an IBtree space compression algorithm was proposed to reduce the storage space of index by remove redundant information in the BF, a considerable storage space and extra computation overhead were still required. we focus on the secure and efficient range queries in LBS, which enables LBS to find and return the most popularly poi records.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this study, we propose a secure and efficient privacypreserving range query protocol in LBS, while preserving both the location and query content privacy. First, we propose the DBtree construction algorithm, trapdoor generation, and query processing algorithm. Second, we propose the DBtree index element encoding optimization and traversal optimization scheme. Third, we implemented extensive experiments on both the real-world and simulated datasets to evaluate the performance of our scheme. The experimental results demonstrate the efficiency of our scheme. For the future work, firstly, we'll study the dynamic update issue for the index structure to fit the poi records' change. Secondly, we'll discuss the problem of the integrity verification for the query results. 
